Journal of Political Science
Volume 25

Number 1

Article 4

November 1997

Peacekeeping From a Realist Viewpoint: Nigeria and the OAU
Operation in CHAD
Terry M. Mays

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Mays, Terry M. (1997) "Peacekeeping From a Realist Viewpoint: Nigeria and the OAU Operation in CHAD,"
Journal of Political Science: Vol. 25 : No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol25/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu.

PEACEKEEPING FROM A REALIST
VIEWPOINT: NIGERIA AND THE OAU
OPERATION IN CHAD
Terry M Mays, Citadel
A successful multinational peacekeeping operation needs the
cooperation of states willing to contribute men and women to field the
mission. The Nigerian government, located in the new capital of Abuja,
is the most frequent African provider of observers, police, and military
contingents for multinational peacekeeping operations around the globe.
Between 1964 and 1997, Nigeria contributed personnel to a total of23
multinational peacekeeping missions -12 on the African continent and
11 outside of the continent. The Nigerian peacekeepers have served in
missions fielded by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOW AS) . All nine Nigerian prime ministers or presidents, military
and civilian, have either personally participated in a peacekeeping
operation or have held the title of commander in chief of the Nigerian
armed forces during an Abuja supported peacekeeping mission. Why
would a relatively new and underdeveloped state such as Nigeria
participate so heavily in international peacekeeping operations?
The realist and idealist views of international relations provide
interpretations for Nigerian participation in international peacekeeping.
Realists believe that the center of international relations involves states
struggling over conflicting national interests. States constantly attempt to
increase their power, maintain their power, or demonstrate power (Rourke
151). Thus, peacekeeping would be an attempt to exert state power
through the introduction of a multinational military force. Idealists, on the
other hand, believe that states do not have to struggle over conflicting
interests. International relations should be based on cooperation and
moral standards (Rourke 156). Idealists would see peacekeeping as a
cooperative effort to halt hostilities in order to allow negotiators to settle
a crisis. However, statesmen rarely practice one form exclusively over the
other . The realist view offers a better explanation for Nigerian
peacekeeping contributions on the continent of Africa while the idealist.
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view offers a better explanation for Nigerian military contributions
outside of the African continent.
It can be argued from a realist point of view that Nigerian
contributions to multinational peacekeeping operations on the African
continent are extensions of Nigerian foreign policy attempts to increase,
maintain, or demonstrate power. What Abuja is not able to accomplish
through negotiations or threats, it may be able to perform via the use of
international military efforts including peacekeeping . In order to fully
understand this point, one must review how Nigerian politicians and
academics view their country's African policies .
Ambassador Ibrahim A. Gambari, Nigeria's foreign minister
under Major-General Buhari, and Margaret Vogt, a senior Research
Fellow at the government sponsored Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs, advocate the use of a geographical based "concentric circles"
framework when examining Nigerian foreign policy on the African
continent. The framework, originally devised to understand Nigerian
defense policy, has been expanded to include the political and economic
dimensions of foreign policy (Ekoko 133). In explaining the utilization
of concentric circles, Vogt writes that:
Nigeria cannot take on itself the responsibility of
guaranteeing African security without first ensuring its
own territorial boundaries, of the states contiguous to
it, of the West African sub-region, and then one can
operate with confidence at the regional [African
continent] level (Vogt 94).
The framework divides Nigerian foreign policy goals in Africa
into three geographical regions - the core, the West African sub-region,
and the rest of Africa . The first circle, referred to as the "core" by Vogt
and the "innermost circle" by Gambari, includes Nigeria itself and the
contiguous states of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The second
circle refers to the other states in West Africa or the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sub-region. The final
circle represents the African states not included in the other categories
(Gambari 230 and Vogt 94-95).
Although the concentric circles model is helpful for foreign
policy analysis, a modification based on another geographical framework
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advocated by C.M.B. Utete is even more useful. He places the four states
bordering Nigeria into the second category (or sub-regional area) rather
than in the core area. This modification allows for a review of the foreign
policy aims which directly affect the physical territory, people or
government of Nigeria to be separated from an examination of interests
in other states.
For the purposes of this research, the framework begins with the
core goals which center on Nigeria itself. Utete's core category refers to
the security and preservation of the state's territorial integrity and
independence (Utete 47). Thus, the core value refers to foreign policy
goals related to the protection and preservation ofNigeria and Nigerians.
The second category includes the states in the core country's perceived
sub-region of interest, namely West Africa. The third category,
continental issues, matches the last grouping under the concentric circles
model and includes the African states not listed under sub-regional issues.
According to· the model, Nigerian interests intensify the closer
a country is situated to its borders. Nigeria, in order to maintain its
security and project power, uses multinational peacekeeping as a tool to
settle crises that could have an impact on its foreign policy goals. States
outside of the African continent tend to play a smaller role in Nigerian
power politics than those on the continent.
Realist based foreign policy descriptions do not fully explain
Nigeria's involvement in every peacekeeping operation since 1960. A
review of Nigeria's foreign policy pronouncements and a national
conference on peacekeeping reveals an idealist rationale behind its
contributions to international peacekeeping operations outside of the
African continent.
Some Nigerians view their participation in
international peacekeeping as the result of treaty obligations. Second,
international conflict is damaging to global political and economic
relations and all states should be willing to pull their weight in the
attempts to check such turmoil. These statements warrant further
explanation.
First, Nigerians have viewed contributions to multinational
peacekeeping as treaty obligations. If a state joins an international
organization, it should pull its weight in the work of that body and not be
a "free rider". Dr. E. I. Nwogugu, a former Vice Chancellor of the
University ofNigeria, commented during a Nigerian national conference
on peacekeeping that "Nigeria is obliged to send out a peacekeeping force
Volume 25, 1997 \
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in accordance with treaty obligations , especially as, under Article 25 of
the UN Charter , all members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter"
(Nwogugu 17).
Many Nigerians also view international conflict as damaging to
all states on the globe . In response , international peacekeeping is seen as
a tool to stabilize a military crisis while negotiators seek a solution to the
outbreak of hostilities. Therefore , it is in the interest of all countries to
support the formation and fielding of peacekeeping operations which can
provide the conditions conducive for conflict resolution . Nigerian scholar
G. 0 . Olusanya stated that "it is in the pursuit of world peace that Nigeria
has taken part in important peacekeeping operations [outside of the
African continent]" (Olusanya 86). Dr. A. Bolaji Akinyemi, a former
Nigerian foreign minister, remarked that:
it is not Western Europe alone [in contrast to the Soviet
Union and United States which rarely contributed to
peacekeeping missions prior to 1989 due to Cold War
politics] which has the responsibility of playing this
[peacekeeping] role. In a situation where the survival
of the world is threatened, states, no matter how far
away from the scene of conflict, cannot ignore this
threat and cannot profess the luxury of burying their
heads in the sand, ostrichwise ....Underdeveloped states
may of course claim, quite wrongly in my view , that
there is no role for them to play ....For our part at the
Institute [Institute of International Affairs in Lagos],
we will not be tired of reminding Nigerians that the
boundary of the world is not at Idiroko or Sokoto or
Maiduguri or Calabar. We will never be tired of
reminding Nigerians that the boundary of the world is
not just the ECOW AS sub-region or even the African
continent (Akinyemi 2).
This article will now tum to a brief review of Nigerian
peacekeeping participation in Chad. The Nigerian rationale behind this
African operation was based on a realist viewpoint of international
relations under the concentric circle model rather than idealist principles .
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Nigeria organized the 1981-1982 OAU peacekeeping operation in Chad
and contributed approximately half of the total manpower devoted to the
mission.
The chaos in Chad stemmed from two sources - one internal
and the other external to the country. Internally, the Chadian civil war
evolved into a feud between major clan and political faction leaders. By
the late 1970s, the conflict can be seen as a struggle between Goukouni
Weddeye and Hissene Habre with other leaders swearing allegiance to
one of the two men . Nigeria, desiring to end the civil war across its
border, sponsored an agreement known as the Lagos Accords in 1979.
The various political factions fonned a coalition government under the
nominal leadership of Goukouni as a result of the agreement. Habre split
from the coalition in 1980, withdrew to Sudan with his faction , and
initiated a new phase of the civil war.
The turmoil in Chad attracted the attention of three external
powers . France, the fonner colonial master of Chad, desired to protect
its political and economic interests in the country. Libya, interested in the
potentially mineral rich Aouzou strip and later political union, viewed the
chaos as a prime opportunity to spread its influence. The United States
under President Reagan perceived any involvement of Libya's Colonel
Qadaffi outside of his state's borders as a challenge to the West. Thus,
Libya's involvement in the Chad conflict ignited American interests and
concerns in the country. All three states became even more active in Chad
after Habre's renewal of the civil war in 1980. Libya approached
Goukouni with offers of assistance while France and the United States
courted Habre .
The instability of Chad and the attraction of external states to the
area interfered with Nigerian foreign policy goals. President Shagari of
Nigeria remarked at the 1980 OAU summit that his country had a
"legitimate interest and concern about the grave situation in Chad"
(Tijjani and Williams 53). Chad directly affected Nigeria's core value
and sub-regional goals.

Core Value
The renewed turmoil in Chad interfered with Nigeria's needs for
internal security. Chadian refugees burdened Abuja's financial resources
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and endangered the lives ofNigerian citizens . The conflict also provoked
Islamic unrest in northern Nigeria and led to a spillover of the violence
from Chad into northeastern Nigeria . General Gowon , a former president
of Nigeria, regarded West Africa as the first line of defense of Nigerian
territorial integrity (Aluko 196). Former Nigerian External Affairs
Minister Ibrahim Gambari summarized the direct threat to his country by
the conflict in Chad when he remarked in 1984 that "Chad is not a
theoretical case, it is a very real problem . What happens there affects us
directly" (Akinrinade, "Threats" 55).

Refugee Issues
Nigeria took the conflict in Chad seriously . Each time the civil
war intensified , thousands of refugees streamed across the international
borders into Sudan, Cameroon , Central African Republic, Niger, Libya,
and Nigeria. The largest number of refugees fled the country when the
conflict shifted to the region around N'Djamena, the capital of Chad,
forcing people to flee across the Chari River into Cameroon or further
west into Nigeria . By 1981, the unregistered refugees in Nigeria's Borno
state numbered somewhere between 30,000 and 110,000. The officials
were not sure how many refugees entered Nigeria due to the Chadians'
habit of melting into the rural population , with whom many were
ethnically related, and/or taking refuge in remote areas ("Tragedy" 421 ).
The registered refugee population became a burden on the
Nigerian government which did not initially receive any outside assistance
from the United Nations or Western donors . As the numbers increased,
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) established
an office in Maiduguri in an attempt to assist Nigeria and to help prepare
a repatriation program for late 1981. However, many of the Chadian
refugees supported Habre and refused to be repatriated to a situation in
Chad where no one could guarantee their safety from Goukouni's allies .
By December 1981, only 600 refugees had taken advantage of the
repatriation program while many others did return home on their own
("Tragedy" 422).
Besides being a financial burden which Nigerian officials
declared as "taxing their patience", the refugees were also a threat to the
security of the state ("Flurry" l 0475). Chadian refugees were often armed
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due to the proliferation of weapons in their home country. Some armed
refugees turned to banditry in Nigeria making travel in rural eastern Borno
state hazardous and all were seen as potential pawns subject to the
manipulati on of external enemies of Nigeria (Sesay 14 January 1991).
Clashes with armed Chadian refugees peaked in October 1982 when
Nigeria blamed the former for disturbances in Kano, Maiduguri, and
Kaduna (Baker 85).

Conflict Spillover
In addition to a refugee problem, Nigeria faced armed Chadian
dissidents who periodically crossed the border and attacked Nigerian
civilians,forcing a military reinforcement of the Borno state border area
("Flurry" 10475). "Cha~ian bandits" periodically "deprived" Nigerian
fishermen of their catch, rustled cattle, and killed Nigerian citizens
(Nigeria 3).
Nigeria displayed concern as late as February 1981 that
hostilities in Chad could spread across the border as various factions,
including Habre's Northern Armed Forces (FAN), retreated before
Goukouni and his ally, the Libyan army ("Strong" 10399). Ambassador
Olu Sanu, the Secretary of the Lagos Accords Chad Committee ,
reaffirmed this concern when he remarked to the author that Nigeria
feared a spillover effect from the civil war in Chad (18 January 1991).
However, Habre retreated into western Sudan where he was covertly
welcomed and re-supplied as a counter to Libya. Despite crossing an
international border, Habre's presence prompted Libyan military action in
Sudan which substantiated Nigerian concern about conflict spillover
across frontiers . Following Habre's defeat of Goukouni in 1982, Nigerian
concerns were fully realized when its troops clashed with those of
N'Djamena in the Lake Chad region, resulting in the officially reported
deaths of at least nine Nigerian and seventy-five Chadian soldiers
(Nigeria 3).
Nigerians did not trust the French military units that were based
in Chad until 1980, but having Libyan military forces so close was
intolerable . The Libyan presence in Chad impacted on Nigeria's core
values of security, territorial integrity and self-preservation. Libya viewed
the Chadian conflict as an opportunity to spread its influence into
0
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Sub-Saharan Africa (Ndovi 146-147) . Nigeria viewed the fundamentalist
Islamic riots in Kano by the Maitatsine sect in December 1980 as having
Libyan roots (Adebayo 29 and lrelewuyi 25). Nearly one thousand people
were killed in Kano before calm could be restored to the area . Two
months later, Nigeria and other West African states ordered Libya to close
its embassies following their conversion to "People's Bureaus" that many
believed would become centers for Libyan instigated destabilization
(Baker 84).
Nigeria , like many states with an army of occupation on the other
side of its border, had to consider the possibility of armed attacks or
subversion across the frontier. Although the Libyan army did not threaten
Nigeria while in Chad , Tripoli did have a reputation for military
adventurism in Africa. Well equipped Libyan soldiers occupied Chad's
Aouzou Strip in 1973, engaged in a brief border war with Egypt in 1977,
intervened in the Tanzanian-Ugandan War in 1978-1979, and frequently
violated Sudanese airspace and territory in pursuit of Chadian factions
including Habre's FAN. Tripoli also practiced a policy of aiding dissident
groups in other states. Between 1975 and the 1980 Libyan intervention
in Chad, Tripoli assisted dissidents in Niger, Sudan, Tunisia, Somalia,
Egypt, Zaire , and the Western Sahara (LeMarchand "Introduction" 9).
Olajide Aluko informs readers that one of the lessons of the
Nigerian civil war included the "need to have friendly governments in
neighboring countries" in order to eliminate interference in Nigerian
domestic issues ("The Civil War" 178-179). Nigerian interest in Chad's
internal turmoil, French intervention, and Libya's military support for
Goukouni resulted from this concern to have friendly as well as stable
governments in neighboring states .

Sub-Regional Goals
General Gowon stated that the West African subsystem was
Nigeria's "special area of interest" (Aluko Essays 234). This "interest"
included regional economic cooperation and integration with which
Nigeria stood "to benefit greatly from the increased trade" (Wright 95).
The civil war in Chad had implications for Nigeria's attainment of
regional foreign policy goals . As discussed earlier in this study, Abuja
requires political and economic stability in West Africa in order to
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promote its own self-development and security. In order to build regional
economic cooperation under its leadership, Nigeria needed to reduce any
external influence in the area which normally increased during periods of
instability as in Chad.
Associated with the need for internal stability is a concern about
external military intervention in West Africa. The two are related since
an unstable state can attract external military involvement while foreign
intervention can promote or prolong destabilization in a country.

Regional Economic Development
Instability and civil war in Chad had a negative impact on
Nigeria's attempts to promote regional economic development in the Lake
Chad area. Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria formed the Chad Basin
Commission in 1964 to coordinate the utilization of valuable water
resources and to protect the environment in this Sahelian region.
However, the turmoil promoted by the civil war served to weaken the
organization due to a lack of security in the area around Lake Chad
(Ofoegbu 87-88). In addition, when the Chadian civil war flared up in
1979, the Commission's records were destroyed during an attack on the
headquarters building in N'Djamena. The signatory states found
enforcement of agreements in the region impossible since the Chadian
government in N'Djamena did not effectively control its territory and
water assets. Local Chadians, acting independently of the weak central
government in N'Djamena, often ignored restrictions on water usage and
boundary demarcations (Nigeria 3).
Instability at the Chadian central government level helped
promote a disagreement with Nigeria over their common border across the
shrinking Lake Chad. As new islands rose above the receding water, the
two states originally agreed to conduct joint border patrols to ensure
citizens of each country remained on their respective sides of the
international frontier. However, according to an official Nigerian
government document, "this arrangement broke down with the breaking
down of law and order in the Republic of Chad" (Nigeria 3). Border
tensions culminated in early 1983 when Nigerian and Chadian "national"
soldiers of the Habre government clashed while the latter were conducting
anti-rebel operations in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria 3).
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French Military Intervention
The civil war attracted the attention of France - the former
colonial ruler of Chad and, according to former Nigerian External Affairs
minister Akinyemi, the "number one enemy of Africa" (West Africa 12
Oct 87 p 2045) . France, whose motivations include economic, strategic,
and cultural concerns, has maintained closer relations with its former
colonies in Africa than have the other former colonial powers (Martin 9
and Botte 4). Nigeria lies in the heart of what I. William Zartman calls
the "Active Zone" of French domination in Africa ("Africa" 43) . Paris,
according to Zartman, maintains relations with Africa based on three
zones .
The Active Zone stretches from Senegal to Zaire and is an area
of French economic and political dominance ("Africa" 43) . All four
states that border Nigeria are listed in the Active Zone. The second area,
the Passive Zone, covers the states southeast of Zaire which attract less
French interest because they were not French colonies. The Mixed Zone,
the third grouping, includes states along the Mediterranean and the Red
Sea some of which experienced French colonization while others did not
(Zartman, "Africa" 50-53).
The significance of the Active Zone to French foreign policy can
be seen in the military relations between Paris and the states in the area.
France maintains defense arrangements with eight African states - six
in the Active Zone; technical military assistance agreements with
twenty-five African states - thirteen in the Active Zone; permanent troop
basing rights with five African states - four in the Active Zone; and
between 1977 and 1979, launched or continued five military operations
in Africa - all in the Active Zone (Chipman 23) . France, which mans
military garrisons in the Active Zone states of Senegal, Gabon, Cote
d'Ivoire, and the Central African Republic, has not hesitated to deploy or
threaten to deploy these forces when its perceived interests are at stake
(Chaigneau 53). Between 1977 and the 1979 unilateral Nigerian
peacekeeping operation in Chad, Paris militarily intervened twice in Zaire
(1977 and 1978); reinforced its detachment in Senegal in support of
Mauritania against the POLISARIO (1977-1978); maintained a garrison
in Chad; and supported a coup in the Central African Republic ( 1979)
(Moose 68-84).
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Nigeria has never fuJly trusted French ambitions in the region .
During the Nigerian civil war, France and many francophone states
actively supported the breakaway region ofBiafra as a means of reducing
the potential power of the anglophone state (Mazrui and Tidy 206) . The
francophone states of the Active Zone have always been wary of their
giant anglophone neighbor's ambitions and dominating army (Nicol 12
June 1990 and Wright I 07) . These francophone countries still look to
France for their security in this Zone as shown by the number of defense
agreements and the basing of French troops in the area ("Summits" 52).
Nigeria faced the implied threat of French military intervention after
becoming embroiled in a brief border dispute with Cameroon in May
1981. France "rattled its sabers" by conducting a series of naval
maneuvers with Cameroon and thus persuaded the Shagari government to
move quickly to a diplomatic settlement of the potential crisis (Bach 82).
A major goal of Nigerian foreign policy in Chad as well as the
rest of West Africa has been to minimize the "corruptive" influence of
France (Sesay 14 January 1991). General Gowon mentioned that Nigeria
should do everything possible "to stop African countries [from] being
used as tools by imperialists [e.g. France -- author] ..." and he added that
if Nigerian persuasion failed to change African countries from allowing
imperialist intervention then "other methods" would be employed (Aluko
Essays 240).
In order to promote its regional foreign policy goals, Nigeria
needed to eliminate the instability in Chad and the resulting French
military presence the turmoil attracted. Nigeria's regional requirements
prompted the Kano and Lagos Accords and a 1979 unilateral
peacekeeping opera~ion to replace French soldiers in Chad before the
OAU operation in 1981.

Libyan Military Intervention
Libyan adventures in Chad, like French interventions, countered
Nigerian sub-regional foreign policy goals. Unlike France, Libya did not
have a historical role in Western Africa and thus exhibited a different set
of priorities . Libya's military interventions and aid programs in Chad can
be seen in support of Tripoli's foreign policy goals of establishing a
Tripoli dominated Sahelian state; securing the Aouzou Strip and its
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potential mineral wealth; and propping up "friendly" and/or anti-Western
governments. Tripoli's actions helped prolong and intensify Chad's civil
war through support for Goukouni's faction.
The attempts of Colonel Qadaffi to establish a greater Sahelian
state made a considerable impact on Nigeria . The formation of a greater
Sahelian state would present a new, direct challenge to stabilization
efforts in the area since Nigeria would face economic and political
competition from a rival regional hegemon . To make matters worse, the
new regional hegemon would be under the guidance of a man who has
demonstrated a zeal for military and political adventures in other states.
Libya, under Qadaffi, exhibits a history of aborted or unsuccessful
political mergers with other Islamic states. Failed Libyan mergers in
Africa prior to the 1981 attempt with Chad include agreements with the
states of Egypt (1972), Algeria (1973), and Tunisia (1974) (LeMarchand
"Introduction" 7). However, the 1981 declaration of a political merger
between Tripoli and N'Djamena directly challenged Nigeria's perceived
area of interest and established the possibility of a permanent -Libyan
presence on the border of the state .
,
Libyan interests also stemmed from the desire to annex the
Aouzou Strip in northern Chad. The contest over the Aouzou Strip
resulted from a historical border dispute dating back to 1899; the potential
mineral wealth of the area; the need for a southern security zone; the
desire to reunite a divided ethnic group; and the personal pride of the
charismatic leader, Qadaffi. Libya took advantage of the Chadian civil
war and the removal of French soldiers from the northern
Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) to occupy the Aouzou Strip in 1973.
Tripoli's interest in the Aouzou Strip became a springboard for
further moves in Chad and the establishment of another occupation army
on Nigeria's border. In mid 1980 when a French military intervention
force withdrew from Chad, Tripoli used the occasion to physically
intervene on behalf of Goukouni's coalition against Habre's FAN and in
January 1981 announced a proposed political merger of the two states.
Libya originally worked with Nigeria to remove the French army
from Chad. However, Qadaffi surprised Nigeria with his 1980 unilateral
intervention in Chad on behalf of Goukouni. Nigeria, relying on
diplomacy, refused to directly condemn the Libyan ·occupation until
Tripoli and N'Djamena announced the proposed political merger in
January 1981. Once Tripoli declared the new political merger, Libyan
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soldiers became even more intolerable than French troops had been in
Chad and Nigeria actually coordinated its policy with France in the
attempt to remove the occupation army across its border.
Qadaffi demonstrated in Uganda ( 1978-1979) and Chad that he
would not hesitate to use his military, including the African recruited
Islamic Legion, to aid friends on the continent (Foltz "Libya's Military"
62). Nigeria took this observation into consideration and the removal of
the Libyan army after the announced political merger became an
important objective of the Shagari government {Tijjani and Williams 53).
Nigeria needed to intervene and stabilize the civil strife in Chad.
Ofoegbu and Ogbuagu identified a problem facing Nigerian planners.
How could Nigeria justify a military intervention in the domestic affairs
of another African state? A peacekeeping operation offered a logical
choice since it presented the picture of a peaceful, legitimate source of
military intervention. Nigeria decided to act to restore the status quo in
its neighbor but rather than overtly intervene with military forces, the
government and military chose to separate the warring factions with a
"peacekeeping force". The image of multinational soldiers under the
banner of an international organization to separate the warring Chadian
factions presented a more acceptable tone than a unilateral Nigerian
invasion. Ofoegbu remarked in 1978 that:
...Nigeria found itself in great difficulty,justifying any
Nigerian action likely to be interpreted to mean
interference in the internal affairs of other African
states [e.g. Chad -- author]. ..and required limited
intervention by Nigeria in order to restore order,
normalcy, and good neighborliness (Ofoegbu 122).
Peacekeeping is a means of projecting the power of a state in
cooperation with others and, depending upon the mandating international
organization, allowing someone else to pay the tab. Nigeria intervened in
Chadian internal politics with a multinational peacekeeping force based
upon realist views of international relations. The crisis in Chad, an
adjacent state, threatened Nigeria which, in tum, acted to project its power
and restore the status quo.
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